Facts. TataCliQ’s operator carried forward, through Form GST TRAN-1 under Section 140, the closing CENVAT balance disclosed in its April–June 2017 service tax return — about ₹31.84 crore of basic credit, ₹74.67 lakh of Krishi Kalyan Cess and ₹22.14 lakh of VAT credit on stock. A 2022 show cause notice alleged the transitioned credit was unsubstantiated, and the demand with interest and 100% penalty under Section 74 was confirmed by the adjudicating and first appellate authorities for July 2017 to March 2018, the appellant having reversed the KKC portion under protest.

Ruling. The Tribunal held the disputed amount was the undisputed closing balance of returns filed under the erstwhile law, which the saving provisions in Sections 142(6)(a) and 174(2)(e) preserve for action only under that law — CGST authorities have no jurisdiction to reassess its correctness through Section 74, a closing balance being a derivative figure incapable of invoice-wise correlation. Following Usha Martin, SAIL and Kunjal Synergies, recovery of allegedly inadmissible legacy credit lies only under the erstwhile enactments. Applying Godrej & Boyce, the KKC transition was upheld pending operationalisation of the relevant Explanations to Section 140, the Section 140(6) VAT credit was found duly substantiated, and the Section 74 penalty was struck down as the entire dispute flowed from the appellant’s own disclosures. The appeal was allowed with consequential relief.

Facts. On a homebuyer’s complaint that the developer of the ‘Morning Raaga’ project at Hyderabad charged 12% GST without passing on additional ITC by commensurate price reduction, the DGAP first reported in 2021. After the Delhi High Court laid down the profiteering methodology in Reckitt Benckiser, a re-investigation was ordered, and a revised report (August 2025) found nil eligible pre-GST credit against 10.63% post-GST ITC, computing a base profiteered amount of ₹84,94,491 (₹95,13,829 with GST). The matter came before the Principal Bench, empowered from 01.10.2024, the developer contending the proceedings stood abated under Notification No. 19/2024.

Ruling. On merits, the Tribunal held Section 171(1) casts a statutory duty to pass on ITC benefit by commensurate price reduction; the revised computation, built on the developer’s own records and the Reckitt Benckiser methodology, was undisputed and established the contravention. It held Notification No. 19/2024 to be purely prospective — barring only fresh examination requests from 01.04.2025 — with no language providing for abatement of proceedings already instituted, so the absence of a saving clause could not import automatic termination. Mere pendency of the constitutional challenge to Section 171 before the Supreme Court, without any stay, was held not to bar adjudication. The developer was directed to refund ₹95,13,829 with 18% interest to eligible buyers within three months; no penalty was levied as the period preceded 01.01.2020.

Facts. The petitioners were arrested in December 2025 in a DGGI investigation alleging creation of 26 fake firms, issue of bogus invoices of about ₹1,161 crore and fraudulent passing of ITC of about ₹176 crore, with an alleged total loss to the exchequer of around ₹197 crore. Charged under Sections 132(1)(b) and (c) of the CGST Act read with Section 20 of the IGST Act, they sought regular bail after over seven months’ custody, arguing the case rested on documents already seized, that the ITC figure was an unadjudicated investigative estimate, and that no recovery had been made from them. The Revenue opposed, citing the quantum and the recovery of incriminating stamps during the raid.

Ruling. Relying on the Supreme Court in Ratnambar Kaushik, Vineet Jain, Ashutosh Garg and Vipin Garg, the Court reiterated that for Section 132(1) offences punishable up to five years, bail should ordinarily be granted before trial absent extraordinary circumstances. It found the prosecution rested predominantly on electronic and documentary evidence already on record, the proposed witnesses were government officers (making tampering unlikely), the disputed contentions required trial-stage examination, and the petitioners had undergone substantial custody with no antecedents and roots in society. Regular bail was granted subject to conditions including surrender of passports, non-tampering with evidence, non-influencing of witnesses and appearance at every hearing, with liberty to the trial court to add conditions and to the department to seek cancellation on breach.

Facts. The short question was whether posting a show cause notice and the order-in-original solely in the ‘View Additional Notices and Orders’ tab of the common portal amounts to valid service. The petitioner argued the CGST Rules nowhere permit service of an SCN/order through the portal and that Rule 142 was not complied with, as nothing was actually transmitted (e.g. by email). The Revenue relied on the assessee’s participation by filing a reply and on Section 115 of the Finance Act, 2022, which retrospectively widened the functions performable on the portal to ‘all functions provided under the CGST Rules, 2017’.

Ruling. Holding the issue no longer res integra, the Court applied its rulings in Luxmi Traders and The Amar Cooperative LC Society, under which portal-only upload is insufficient unless receipt is acknowledged or a reply filed; an ex parte order on an unacknowledged, portal-only SCN restores proceedings to the SCN stage, and a contested order served only via the portal does not trigger limitation, permitting appeal within four weeks and restoration of appeals earlier dismissed as time-barred. On the retrospective amendment, the Court held that none of the CGST Rules designate the portal as a mode of service of notices/orders — its utility being confined to registration, returns and payment — so the wider 2022 language does not legitimise portal-only service. The petition was disposed of on the same terms.

Facts. The petitioner’s GST registration was cancelled with retrospective effect from 31.08.2023 by orders dated 24.03.2025 and 15.05.2026. The show cause notice preceding the cancellation, however, neither proposed nor referred to any retrospective cancellation. Relying on the Division Bench in Bansal Casting, S.K. Enterprises v. Union of India, the petitioner contended that a retrospective cancellation travelling beyond the SCN cannot be sustained; the State disputed neither the facts nor the law so laid down.

Ruling. Finding the controversy squarely covered by Bansal Casting, S.K. Enterprises, the Court held that retrospective cancellation of registration cannot exceed what the show cause notice proposes — an assessee cannot be visited with a consequence he was never called upon to meet, which offends the principles of natural justice. It quashed the cancellation orders dated 24.03.2025 and 15.05.2026, while expressly reserving liberty to the respondents to issue a fresh, properly-worded show cause notice and to proceed afresh in accordance with law. The retrospective date, being unsupported by the notice, could not stand.

Facts. An order under Section 73 of the BGST Act passed on 06.03.2020 had disallowed ITC on tax invoices and debit notes as availed beyond the period prescribed by Section 16(4), and recovery followed. The petitioner invoked the retrospective insertion of sub-sections (5) and (6) in Section 16 (with effect from 01.07.2017) and Circular No. 237/31/2024-GST dated 15.10.2024, contending that the credit was now within time and seeking quashing of the order and refund with statutory interest. The Revenue pointed to Paragraph 3.5 of the circular, which prescribes a special rectification route under Section 148 for precisely such orders.

Ruling. The Court held that the petitioner’s entitlement to the retrospectively extended ITC window was best examined by the competent authority through the rectification mechanism contemplated in Paragraph 3.5 of Circular No. 237/31/2024-GST, rather than by a writ testing the original order on merits. It granted liberty to file the rectification application within one month and directed the competent authority to afford a hearing and pass a reasoned order within three months of filing. The relief was thus channelled into the statutory special procedure designed to give effect to the Section 16(5)/(6) amendment in concluded cases.